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FORUM
JACK, A/K/A JACK IN THE
BEAN STALK v. STATE
(Another mythical appeal, with, of course, a mythical
opinion inspired by the "non-violent" stories of Mother
Goose) by Richard P. Gilbert.* The case was argued be-
fore Learned, Strait, and Wordy, JJ. Per Curiam.
This appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore
challenges the judgments of that court entered on a
jury's verdict as a result of several indictments handed-
up' by the Grand Jury of Baltimore City.
Jack was charged with murder, felony-murder, assault
with intent to commit murder, assault, the wilful destruc-
tion of personal property, theft of personal property hav-
ing a market value of $300 or more, 2 theft of personal
property having a market value of less than $300, 3 tres-
pass, and carrying a deadly weapon openly for the pur-
pose of injuring another.
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Following the presentation of evidence at a three day
trial before a jury, presided over by Judge Les Hart, ver-
dicts of guilty were returned by the jury with respect to
the felony murder, assault, theft of personal property
having a value of $300 or more, destruction of personal
property, and carrying a deadly weapon. Judge Les
Hart merged the assault conviction into the felony-
murder as a lesser included offense. He also merged,
into the felony-murder count, the weapon carrying
charge. Judge Les Hart imposed a mandatory life sen-
tence for the felony murder, 15 years imprisonment as
to the theft conviction, to be served consecutive to the
life sentence, and suspended generally the sentence with
regard to the trespass. The jury's verdict with respect to
all other charges was "Not guilty."
Reeling under the realization that life plus 15 years is
a rather long sentence even for a rugged rascal, Jack has
raced to this Court where he seeks relief.5
*A.A., J.D., LL.M., LL.D. (Hon.). University of Baltimore; Chief
Judge, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
1 The term "handed-up" probably has its origin in the fact that the
Grand Jury, upon the completion of its daily deliberations, files, en
masse, into Criminal Court Part 1, and literally hands up to the pre-
siding judge the "true bills" that the Grand Jury that day returned.2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (F)(1).
3 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (F)(2).
4 MD ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36.
s We were advised on oral argument that the personal representative
of the Giant has civil actions pending against Jack and Jack's
mother in conversion, and against Jack for the gigantic funeral bill.
Additionally, Mrs. Giant has instituted a civil action against the ap-
pellant and his mother under Lord Campbell's Act. Md. Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. § 3-904; Md. Estates and Trusts
Code Ann. § 7-401 (x)(2).
Jack contends that the Criminal Court of Baltimore
erred in proceeding to trial because 1) it lacked jurisdic-
tion because Jack was under 14 years of age at the time
of the commission of the offenses; 2) it declined to
waive jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court where, in view
of his age, the case actually should have been tried; 3)
the Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction over Jack even if
he did commit the theft; 4) the search and seizure evi-
dence should have been suppressed; 5) the evidence
does not support the verdicts; 6) the jury was unconsti-
tutionally constituted in that it was not a jury of his
peers; 7) that prosecution of the assault, trespass and
deadly weapons charges were barred by the statute of
limitations; and 8) the trial court erred in refusing either
to instruct the jury or to allow counsel to inform the ju-
rors as to the penalties which could be imposed if Jack
were found guilty of each or all the offenses with which
he was charged.
Before we begin our discussion of the law applicable
to the issues posited to us, we shall laconically set the
stage upon which the drama giving rise to this case was
played.
Jack, according to the State's evidence, learned that a
person known only by the appellation "Giant" pos-
sessed a unique domesticated waterfowl, a goose that
was endowed with a visceral structure that chemically al-
tered its eggs from the normal calcium, albumen, and vi-
tellus into solid 24 carat gold. 6 Jack stealthily climbed a
bean stalk and, without permission, entered the realm of
the Giant. The record reveals that Jack managed to lo-
cate the goose. Before he was able to snatch the bird
from the Giant, that huge fellow, obviously through the
use of his olfactory organ, detected Jack's unauthorized
presence on the premises. Exclaiming, "Fee, 7 fi, fo, fum!
I smell an Englishman," 8 the Giant commenced a search
of the property in order to ferret out the interloper. Fear-
ing he would be caught "Giant-handed," Jack grabbed
the goose and fled harum-scarum to the place where he
had unlawfully entered the Giant's property. Jack's
noisy dash toward the bean stalk attracted the attention
of the Giant. With the big man in hot pursuit, Jack made
his way to the bean stalk and commenced his descent.
During his downward climb, the goose was, we are told,
"peopled" three times. 9 Not so easily eluded, the Giant
followed and started to climb down the stalk too. Jack,
upon reaching the ground, unhooked an axe which he
6 At today's gold prices, currently in excess of $600 per ounce, the
goose is invaluable.
7 The inadvertent use of the word "fee" should not mislead the
reader to believe the Giant was a member of the bar.
8 Seemingly, Jack was not familiar with the various advertisements by
deodorant manufacturers.
9 No charge of cruelty to animals or fowl has been lodged against
Jack so we do not consider it.
had carried, unsheathed, on his belt. He chopped down
the stalk. When the stalk was severed, it, naturally, top-
pled to earth carrying along the unfortunate Giant who
clung to its strong fiber for fear of a fatal fall. The crash
to earth literally knocked the life from the Giant.
Acting on information received from a telephone tip,
Detective Nabber of the Baltimore City Police Depart-
ment visited the house occupied by Jack and his
mother. The detective informed the mother that while
investigating the death of the Giant he had learned that
Jack was seen in the vicinity of the crime. He told Jack's
mother that he would like to talk to Jack in order to find
out if Jack had witnessed anything involving the Giant.
The detective did not say that he suspected Jack's in-
volvement. In a spirit of cooperation, the mother invited
Nabber into the house. While he was seated in the living
room, the detective saw a goose that matched the de-
scription of the one stolen from the Giant's household.
Under the guise of using the bathroom, which was lo-
cated on the second floor of the home, Nabber went to
the second floor. Once there, he started down the hall to
the bathroom. In so doing, he passed a doorway to a
bedroom. The door, the detective said, was wide open.
He looked into the room and saw, in plain view, several
golden eggs on the pillow of the bed. Nabber immedi-
ately left the house. He radioed the information about
the golden eggs to headquarters and requested that a
search and seizure warrant be obtained. Nabber contin-
ued to watch the house. An hour or so later, a team of
police officers arrived with the search and seizure war-
rant. The warrant was served on Jack's mother, and the
search was undertaken. In addition to the officers' get-
ting the goose, they also found and seized five golden
eggs and an axe. While the search was in progress, Jack
returned home, and he was immediately arrested by De-
tective Nabber.
The Grant Jury, as we have previously noted, indicted
Jack on the counts for which he was tried.
Prior to trial, Jack's attorney, Deid I. Springum,
moved to suppress the evidence that was seized as a
result of the execution of the search and seizure warrant.
Judge Les Hart denied the motion and allowed the fruits
of the search to be received into evidence at the trial on
the merits.
We turn now to the questions presented by Jack,
which we shall discuss in the order he has put them to
us.
I.
"The Criminal Court of Baltimore
lacked jurisdiction over the appellant."
The gist of Jack's argument is that Maryland Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. § 3-804(d)(1) pre-
vents the Criminal Court from exercising jurisdiction be-
cause the record shows that Jack was under the age of
14 years at the time of the alleged offense.
Courts Art. § 3-804(d) provides in pertinent part:
"The [juvenile] court does not have jurisdiction
over:
(1) A child 14 years old or older alleged to have
done an act which, if committed by an adult,
would be a crime punishable by death or life im-
prisonment, as well as all other charges against the
child arising out of the same incident, unless an or-
der removing the proceeding to the [juvenile]
court has been filed pursuant to § 594A of Article
27 .... "
Pointing to that statutory provision, Jack asserts that it
is apparent that the Legislature meant that a child under
the age of 14 was not subject to a court exercising crimi-
nal jurisdiction. Jack reasons that section 3-804(d) con-
fers exclusive jurisdiction on the juvenile court in the
case of any child under age 14. Neither the Criminal
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Court nor a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, he ar-
gues, ordinarily possesses the necessary authority to try
a child who falls within the ambit of section 3-804(d) or
who has not been "waived" by the juvenile court to the
court exercising criminal jurisdiction, citing Franklin v.
State, 264 Md. 62, 285 A.2d 616 (1972); Aye v. State,
17 Md. App. 32, 299 A.2d 513 (1973); Austin v. State,
12 Md. App. 629, 630-31, 280 A.2d 17 (1971).
Inasmuch as no waiver hearing was ever held, Jack
opines that the Criminal Court should not have pro-
ceeded to trial. While he acknowledges that he did not
raise the issue in the trial court, Jack contends that juris-
diction may be raised initially or at any stage of the pro-
ceedings. Carroll v. State, 19 Md. App. 179, 181-82,
310 A.2d 161 (1973). See also Tate v. State, 236 Md.
312, 203 A.2d 882 (1964); Bowen v. State, 206 Md.
368, 111 A.2d 844 (1955); Waldrop v. State, 12 Md.
App. 371, 278 A.2d 619 (1971); Wheeler v. State, 10
Md. App. 624, 272 A.2d 96 (1971).
The State concedes that there was no waiver hearing,
and that the matter was taken directly before the Grand
Jury, which, as we have said, returned the indictment
against Jack for murder and other crimes "arising out of
the same incident." They argue, however, that in light of
the "aggravated circumstances" of the instant case, as
disclosed by the evidence, the error in failing to hold a
waiver hearing was "harmless." The State adopts that
position because "it is obvious," they say, "that the facts
of the case dictate waiver to the Criminal Court." The
State asserts that this case "is clearly one of felony-
murder, committed by the appellant, after he had stolen
the goose that laid the golden eggs, in order to avoid be-
ing caught by the victim. Rather than stand trial for lar-
ceny or cruelty to animals, Jack elected to slay his vic-
tim, thus, eliminating what he believed to be the only
witness to the crimes."
We do not share the view of the State or of Jack. Al-
though it would seem that if the juvenile court had held
a waiver hearing, pursuant to Courts Art. § 3-817(d), it
could have waived its jurisdiction in the instant case,
Courts Art. § 3-817(a)(2),l ° the courts are not at liberty
to employ "short cuts" and thereby avoid the pellucid
message of the people as spoken through the General
Assembly. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that the
juvenile court did not waive its original, exclusive juris-
diction, Courts Art. § 3-804(a). Therefore, the Criminal
Court was without jurisdiction to proceed in the case.
Courts Art. § 3-807(a) provides:
"A person subject to the jurisdiction of the [ju-
venile] court may not be prosecuted for a criminal
i°That section provides that the juvenile court may waive its jurisdic-
tion over any child "who has not reached his 15th birthday, but
who is charged with committing an act which if committed by an
adult, would be punishable by death or life imprisonment."
offense committed before he reaches 18 years of
age unless jurisdiction [of the juvenile court] has
been waived."
The triasll was a nullitln re Trader, 20 Md. App. 1,
315 A.2d 528, rev'd on other grounds, 272 Md. 364,
325 A.2d 398 (1974).
The State's argument relative to harmless error must
fall of its own weight inasmuch as the trial court did not
have any jurisdiction in the case. We append that mat-
ters of jurisdiction are not within the ambit of harmless
error under either Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); or Dorsey v.
State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1975). Moreover,
we cannot presuppose that the juvenile court will waive
its jurisdiction over the appellant.
Ordinarily, we would terminate our discussion at this
point inasmuch as the jurisdictional issue is dispositive of
the appeal. We shall not do so in this case, however, be-
cause of the possibility that the waiver may be granted.
Instead, we shall comment for the guidance of the trial
court on some of the other issues raised by appellant.
Md. Rule 1085. We make clear that we are not to be
understood as suggesting to the juvenile court that it
waive its jurisdiction in the instant case. We do not imply
that it should do so.
II.
'[The trial judge] erred in refusing to 'reverse'
waive the case to the juvenile court."
Jack did not move to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that the Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction over
the accused, Courts Art. § 3-807: Md. Rule 736 a 1, but
seemingly was content at that stage to move merely for
a waiver from the Criminal Court to the juvenile court.
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 594A(a). Why Jack would rely
upon that statute defies comprehension. The "reverse
waiver" is applicable only to children who have reached
their fourteenth birthday but not their eighteenth birth-
day at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.
Reverse waiver is not applicable to a child under the age
of 14 years.
The trial judge was correct in refusing to invoke re-
verse waiver, but certainly not for the reasons he as-
signed. He should have refused waiver because he had
no jurisdiction over the accused in the first instance.
Ergo, having no jurisdiction, he could not waive what he
didn't have. The judge would have been justified in sua
sponte dismissing the indictment.
III.
"The Motion to Suppress the evidence seized at
the home of Jack and his mother should have
been granted."
Jack, through his attorney, Deid I. Springum, moved,
orally, just prior to the commencement of the trial on the
merits of the case, that the evidence seized pursuant to
the execution of the search warrant be suppressed. Md.
Rule 736 a 3. The motion set out two separate and dis-
tinct reasons. First, it was contended that Detective Nab-
ber gained entrance to the appellant's home through co-
ercion, deceit, and trickery. Second, that even if entry
into the house was lawful, the subsequent unauthorized
exploratory expedition through the house constituted an
unlawful intrusion and was, thus, violative of the Fourth
Amendment.
Judge Les Hart denied the motion at hand, ruling that
Jack's counsel had not obeyed the crystal clear fiat of
Md. Rules 736 b, 736 d, and 736 e.11 See Baldwin v.
State, 45 Md. App. 378, 413 A.2d 246 (1980).
The three parts of Md. Rule 736 upon which the trial
judge relied, provide:
"b. Time for Filing Mandatory Motions.
A motion filed pursuant to section a of this Rule
shall be filed within 30 days after the earlier of the
appearance of counsel or the first appearance of
the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule
723 (Appearance -Provision for or Waiver of
Counsel), except when discovery is furnished on
an issue which is the subject of the motion, then
the motion may be filed within five days after the
discovery is furnished.
d. Content of Motions.
A motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall be in
writing unless the court otherwise directs, shall
state the grounds upon which it is made, and shall
set forth the relief sought. A motion alleging an il-
legal source of information as the basis for proba-
ble cause must be supported by precise and spe-
cific factual averments.
e. Statement of Points and Authorities.
Every motion shall contain or be accompanied
by a statement of points and citation of authorities.
A response, if made, shall be filed within 15 days
and be accompanied by a statement of points and
citation of authorities."
When pressed by the trial court as to the reasons why
1 MD. RULE 736 a provides:
"Mandatory Motions.
A motion asserting one of the following matters shall be filed in
conformity with this Rule. Any such matter not raised in accordance
this Rule is waived, unless the court, for good cause shown, or-
ders otherwise.
1. A defect in the institution of the prosecution;
2. A defect in the charging document, other than its failure to
show jurisdiction in the court or to charge any offense which defenses
can be noticed by the court at any time;
3. An unlawful search, seizure, interception of wire or oral com-
munication, or pretrial identification;
4. An unlawfully obtained admission, statement or confession:
5. A motion for joint or separate trial of defendants or offenses."
he did not heed the clarion call of Rule 736, Jack's la-
wyer responded that because of the "press" of his
"heavy trial docket," coupled with his preexisting plans
to be out of the country when the motion was due, he
simply did not get around to it. Moreover, he said he
was not totally familiar with the rule. He contended that
his client should not be penalized for the lawyer's failure.
If the latter were true, few persons would be convicted
of crimes because of the unlikely occurrence of "a per-
fect trial." As Jim Oigan 12 often said, "there are as many
perfect trial lawyers as there are perfect judges - none."
The law is too vast a field for any one mind to grasp it
completely. Indeed, it is doubtful that anyone knows all
there is to know on any one subject of the law, although
there are persons who think they do.
The Court of Appeals and this Court have repeatedly
opined that the Rules of Procedure are precise rubrics to
be read and followed. Both Courts would be ever grate-
ful to the Bar if its members would remember to read
and apply the rules. Had Jack's counsel properly
heeded Rules 736 b and 736 d, the motions to suppress
would have been heard. It might even have met with
success, a point we need not and do not discuss be-
cause we hold that Judge Les Hart did not abuse his dis-
cretion in declining to permit the belated motion.13 The
"reasons" advanced by Mr. Springum do not constitute
"good cause shown" so as to avoid Md. Rule 736 a.
Since the case is being vacated, Jack lives to fight again.
If there is a retrial, hopefully Jack will have profited by
this appeal and will properly follow Rule 736 insofar as
any motion to suppress is concerned.
IV.
"The jury was unconstitutionally constituted be-
cause it was not a jury of appellant's peers."
The essence of appellant's argument is that he is un-
der the age of 14.14 Jack strenuously argues that "Peers
are persons who have equal standing. A jury composed
of people over the age of 18 years; see Courts Art. § 8-
104, are not equals. To be constitutionally firm the ju-
rors who decide Jack's fate must be fourteen years old."
We think appellant reads more into a "jury of his
peers" than was ever contemplated by our forefathers.
"Peers" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed.
1933) to mean: "Equals; those who are a man's equals
in rank and station; thus 'trial by a jury of his peers
means trial by a jury of citizens.' "
12 See Goldilocks, a/k/a Goldy Locks v. State, University of Baltimore,
The Law Forum, Vol. 10, No. 1, p, 17 (1979).
13 If a motion is not filed within the time prescribed in subsection b of
Rule 736, it "is wavied, unless the for good cause shown, orders
otherwise." See Baldwin v. State, supra.14 The record does not disclose Jack's age, but the State has not con-
tested that Jack was under the age of 14.
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Originally, in England, trial by "peers" meant that co-
equals sat in judgment. We have carried forward that
concept. Although there may be several classes of citi-
zens in the United States, we are each other's legal
peers. We have no "titled" nobility. We all come into
this world, theoretically, equals. Each native born citizen
has the opportunity to achieve the highest and most
powerful office in the land, if not in the world, the Presi-
dency of the United States. Other considerations, men-
tal, financial, and physical limitations may lessen that op-
portunity, but the underlying theory remains. One is not
born to the presidency nor to any other appointed or
elected governmental office. Every person born in the
United States, or every citizen 15 may achieve any gov-
ernmental position given "the breaks of the game" or
the fortunate "bounce of the ball."
In any event, we are each other's "peers." Hence, the
jurors were the "peers" of the appellant.
There is no constitutional requirement that in order to
be considered "peers" we must be of the same race,
creed, color, national origin, age or economic class. See:
Wilkins v. State, 16 Md. App. 587, 300 A.2d 411
(1973), aff'd, 270 Md. 62, 311 A.2d 39, cert. denied,
415 U.S. 992 (1973); Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App.
414, 311 A.2d 483 (1973), cert. denied, 271 Md. 738
(1974); Burko v. State, 19 Md. App. 645, 313 A.2d 864
(1974), cert. denied, 271 Md. 732 (1974), vacated on
other grounds, 422 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 2624, 45
L.Ed.2d 667 (1975)16. If all persons were to be tried be-
fore a jury of their peers, as appellant reads "peers,"
Presidents of the United States, Chief Justices, etc.
would never be tried inasmuch as it is impossible under
the laws of nature to have twelve former Presidents or
Chief Justices living at any one and the same time. It
would border on the insane, if indeed, it did not cross
the threshold of insanity to hold that "peers" means ab-
solute equals in all respects. Such a ruling would require
a jury of bank robbers to adjudge the guilt vel non of a
person charged with bank robbery, murderers to try
murderers, and so on ad infinitum, ad nauseam. The is-
sue of the appellant, while a classic example of psychic
pyrotechnics, is devoid of anything resembling merit.
V.
"The charges of assault, trespass, and the use of
a deadly weapon, in a crime of violence were
15 Of course, the federal constitution limits the office of President to
the native born. It logically follows because of the "one heart beat"
that the Vice-Presidency is similarly limited.16 Burko was vacated on the basis of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 42 U.S. 684,
95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 588 (1975) and remanded for further
consideration. As a result of the remand, we reaffirmed our prior
position, Burko v. State, 28 Md. App. 732, 349 A.2d 355 (1975),
cert. denied, 278 Md. 717 (1976), and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981
(1976).
barred by the Statute of Limitations."
Appellant argues that the. statute of limitations, as now
codified in "Courts Art. § 5-106 precludes prosecution
of him for assault, trespass, and the use of a deadly
weapon in a crime of violence." We disagree. The stat-
utes of limitations are not applicable.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of the limitation
question, were the charges before us, we would reverse
the convictions. We would do so for the reasons herein-
after stated.
ASSAULT
There is no crime of assault, although there are crimes
in which assault is an element, e.g., assault and battery,
assault with intent to rape, murder, and rob. Assault, it-
self, as we explained in Christensen v. State, 33 Md.
App. 635, 365 A.2d 562 (1975), is merely an attempt. It
is not a crime until it is joined with some specified of-
fense. Absent that offense, it is little more than a mental
concept that has not reached fruition. Inasmuch as as-
sault, per se, is not a crime, it follows that the criminal
court did not have jurisdiction over it. Ergo, if the matter
is pressed at any subsequent trial, it should be dismissed
by the court.
TRESPASS
Section 577(a) of Article 27 of the Md. Ann. Code
provides in pertinent part:
"Any person ... who remains upon, enters
upon or crosses over the land, premises or private
property, . .. of any person ... in this State after
having been duly notified by the owner or his
agent not to do so shall be fined not more than
$500. This section shall not be construed to in-
clude within its provisions the entry upon or cross-
ing over of any land when such entry or crossing is
done under a bona fide claim or right of owner-
ship of same land, it being the intention of this sec-
tion only to prohibit any wanton trespass upon pri-
vate land of others."
Courts Art. § 5-106(a) bars prosecution for trespass
unless it is commenced within one year after the offense
was committed. The prosecution in the instant case was
so instituted. Thus, section 5-106(a) is not available to
shield Jack from prosecution.
The record in the matter sub judice is silent with re-
spect to whether the Giant "or his agent" ever "duly
notified" Jack that he was trespassing and demanded
his immediate removal. Notification is an essential ele-
ment of the offense. Inasmuch as it was not shown, a
conviction for trespass can not stand.
THE CARRYING OF A DEADLY WEAPON
The record discloses that the "deadly weapon" that
was involved in this case was the axe. An axe is not or-
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dinarily considered to be a deadly weapon any more
than a baseball bat or a golf club. Yet each is capable of
being an instrument of death if it is used for that pur-
pose. The mere carrying of an axe is not a crime, and an
axe is definitely not a handgun.
The charge in the matter now before us was that of
carrying openly an axe with intent to do harm to an-
other, to wit, the Giant.
The evidence established that Jack used the axe to
hack down the bean stalk and thus cause the death of
the Giant because of the latter's sudden stop in coming
in contact with terra firma. The axe, however, was not
used as a weapon directly against the Giant, nor was
there ever an attempt to hit him with it. There is no evi-
dence that the axe was utilized in a fashion to intimidate
the Giant. There is simply no evidence contained within
this record that supports the deadly weapon charge.
VI.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Although Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct.
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), barring some retrials in
criminal cases where the evidence has been adjudged
insufficient by an appellate court is not clearly applicable
to cases where the trial was a nullity, out of our abun-
dance of caution we shall address the issue.
To the factual predicate that we set out in the begin-
ning of this opinion, we shall add the evidence adduced
on behalf of the appellant,. Jack.
According to the appellant, he had been authorized
by his mother 17 to sell her cow at the best possible price.
While he was proceeding to the market place he hap-
pened upon a person whose identity is not revealed.
That person traded Jack a small packet of beans in ex-
change for the cow. The beans were allegedly magic.
Proud of his success as a trader, Jack raced home and
informed his mother of the "fabulous trade" he had
made for the cow. After she heard how Jack had, in her
opinion, been "ripped off" by some city slicker, the
mother, out of disgust and in a rage, threw, a la Jim
Palmer, the beans straight through the window, belt
high and just inside the outside corner. The packets of
beans landed with such force that the paper container
broke and the beans were scattered to the winds. As
luck would have it, there occurred that night a severe
thunder storm. The next morning the beans were found
to have taken root, sprouted and commenced an up-
ward climb into the sky. Curious as to where the stalks
led, young Jack proceeded to climb one of them. High,
up past cloud cover, Jack discovered the estate of the
Giant.
17Our search of the record fails to disclose that there is or was a hus-
band of Jack's mother. Indubitably, Jack had a father, but whether
his mother had a husband is another issue.
Having heard from his mother and others that the Gi-
ant was the reason the appellant's father did not live at
home, Jack conceived the idea of seeking revenge upon
the Giant.
At that point, Jack testified, a "queen-sized," but at-
tractive woman happened along. She espied Jack de-
spite the fact that he sought to avoid her. The woman
introduced herself as Mrs. Giant. After some small talk
she invited Jack to her home. Once there, she insisted
upon his eating some of her tasty pies. During the
course of their conversation, Mrs. Giant used, Jack said,
her feminine wiles to entice him. Jack went on to tell the
court that inasmuch as he could resist everything but
temptation, he succumbed to her charms. While he and
Mrs. Giant were occupied in satisfying their lust, he
heard the ear shattering thumps of the Giant's footsteps
as the Giant approached the house. Fearful that they be
discovered in flagrante delicto, "Mrs. G" (as she had
then familiarly become known to Jack) urged him to
gather up his clothing and flee lest he be caught and
possibly slain by the Giant. Needing little, if any, encour-
agement to practice the ancient art of self-preservation,
Jack did as he was bid. In picking up his clothing, he
said he "mistakenly gathered up" the goose in his coat.
The hissing of the goose attracted the Giant's attention
to Jack. Jack sped to the bean stalk with the Giant in hot
pursuit. Jack related to the fact finder that he used the
axe to sever the bean stalk in order to prevent the
Giant's following him and possibly eventually catching
up with him. Jack added that he was unaware that the
goose laid golden eggs until the next morning when he
found one in the bird's nest in the kitchen of his home.
Jack disavowed any intent to steal the goose or to kill
the Giant.
When Jack's mother testified, she, through a veil of
tears and amid sobs, said that she had painted the Giant
to Jack as an ogre in order to prevent his traveling to the
Giant's property where Jack might learn that the Giant
was really Jack's father. Unwittingly, Jack had commit-
ted patricide.
The Jury, of course, was not required- to believe
Jack's exculpatory statements. Tillery v. State, 3 Md.
App. 142, 238 A.2d 125 (1968); Pickney v. State, 12
Md. App. 598, 283 A.2d 644 (1972). The evidence ad-
duced by the State was sufficient to sustain the charges,
if the matter was properly before the Court.
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